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A multiparty quantum secret report scheme is proposed with quantum encryption. The boss Alice
and her M agents first share a sequence of (M+1)-particle Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger (GHZ)
states that only Alice knows which state each (M+1)-particle quantum system is in. Each agent
exploits a controlled-not (CNot) gate to encrypt the travelling particle by using the particle in the
GHZ state as the control qubit. The boss Alice decrypts the travelling particle with a CNot gate
after performing a σx operation on her particle in the GHZ state or not. After the GHZ states
(the quantum key) are used up, the parties check whether there is a vicious eavesdropper, say Eve,
monitoring the quantum line, by picking out some samples from the GHZ states shared and measure
them with two measuring bases. After confirming the security of the quantum key, they use the
GHZ states remained repeatedly for next round of quantum communication. This scheme has the
advantage of high intrinsic efficiency for qubits and the total efficiency.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.65.Ud
The main task of quantum communication is to trans-
mit message securely between the authorized parties and
its implement can be completed by the transmission of
quantum states.[1, 2] The features of quantum mechanics
such as the uncertainty principle, quantum correlations
and non-locality play an important role for the security of
message.[1] Any of eavesdropper’s action will inevitably
leave a trace in the result and the parties of communi-
cation will detect the eavesdropping by comparing the
results of the samples chosen randomly and then aban-
don all the results transmitted to avoid leaking the se-
cret message.[2] The security of transmission for quantum
communication is embodied to the fact that the sender
Alice and receiver Bob can find out the malicious or dis-
honest action of others. Thus quantum communication
is secure for generating key [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] and secret
message splitting [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16] among
the parties of communication. Experimental implement
for quantum key distribution has been studied by a lot
of groups [2]
Recently, the concept of quantum secure direction
communication (QSDC), which is used not for distribut-
ing key but just for transmitting secret message directly,
was proposed and actively pursued. [17, 18, 19, 20, 21,
22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31] Shimizu and Imoto
[17, 18] and Beige et al. [19] proposed some QSDC
schemes, in which the secret message can be read out
after at least one bit of additional classical information
is transmitted for each qubit. In 2002, Bostro¨m and Fel-
binger [27] introduced an insecure ping-pong scheme for
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direct communication and key distribution [32]. Subse-
quently, we [20] put forward a two-step QSDC protocol
with Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) pairs transmitted
in quantum data block and another one based on a se-
quence of polarized single photons.[21] Wang et al.[22]
introduced a QSDC protocol with high-dimension quan-
tum superdense coding.
In 2005, Gao et al.[33] proposed a scheme for se-
cure direct communication between the central party and
the other M parties with Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger
(GHZ) states. In their scheme, the M parties can com-
municate the central party securely with entanglement
swapping. That is, they can send their secret message
directly to the central party. We call this model the mul-
tiparty quantum secret report (MQSR) as it is used to
complete the task that the agents report their secret mes-
sage to the Boss in one-way direction. In 2006, Jin et al.
[34] introduced another MQSR scheme with GHZ states
following some ideas in quantum dense coding.[35]
In this Letter, we present an MQSR scheme with GHZ
states via quantum encryption. The boss Alice and her
M agents first share a sequence of (M+1)-particle quan-
tum systems with a decoy technique. The states of the
quantum systems are kept by Alice and any other one
does not know. Each agent exploits a controlled-not
(CNot) gate to encrypt the travelling particle T by us-
ing the particle in the GHZ state as the control qubit.
The boss Alice decrypts the travelling particle T with a
CNot gate after performing a σx operation on her parti-
cle in the GHZ state or not, according to the fact that
her particle is correlated or anti-correlated to that con-
trolled by the agent. After the GHZ states are used up,
the parties check whether there is a vicious eavesdropper
monitoring the quantum line by selecting some samples
2and measuring them with two measuring bases (MBs),
X-MB and Y-MB. After confirming the security of the
quantum key, they use the GHZ states remained repeat-
edly for next round of quantum communication. With
quantum storage technique, this scheme has high intrin-
sic efficiency for qubits and the total efficiency.
Now, let us describe the principle of our MQSR scheme
in detail with M agents, say Bobr (r = 1, 2, · · · ,M).
All the (M+1)-particle GHZ states can be described
by [14]
|Gj · · · k
︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
+
〉 = 1√
2
(|0 j · · · k
︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
〉+ |1 j¯ · · · k¯
︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
〉)AB1B2···BM ,
|Gj · · · k
︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
−〉 =
1√
2
(|0 j · · · k
︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
〉 − |1 j¯ · · · k¯
︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
〉)AB1B2···BM ,
(1)
where j, k ∈ {0, 1}, j¯ and k¯ are the counterparts of the
binary numbers j and k, respectively; |0〉 and |1〉 are the
two eigenstates of the Z-MB.
Our MQSR scheme can work with the following steps:
(S1) The Boss Alice shares a sequence of GHZ-state
quantum systems, say Sq, with all her agents Bobr
(r = 1, 2, · · · ,M) privately and securely. That is, Al-
ice prepares each quantum system randomly in one of
the GHZ states {|Gj···k+〉} and keeps the secret infor-
mation about the states for any one. She sends the
particles Br to the agent Bobr and always controls the
particle A for each quantum system. The parties can
analyse the security of the GHZ states by the follow-
ing method. (a) Alice picks out a sufficiently subset
of the states as the samples, say se1 for eavesdropping
check, similar to Ref. [20]. (b) The agents choose X-MB
= {| + x〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉), | − x〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)} or Y-
MB = {| + y〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + i|1〉), | − y〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − i|1〉)}
randomly for their particles in the samples se1. They tell
Alice their MBs for their measurements, and then Al-
ice measures her particles with the correlated MBs. For
example, if the state of the GHZ-state quantum system
is |G0 · · · 0
︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
+
〉 = 1√
2
(|0 0 · · ·0
︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
〉+ |1 1 · · · 1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
〉)AB1B2···BM , Al-
ice chooses X-MB for her particle if the number of the
agents who choose Y-MB for their measurements on their
particles is even, otherwise Alice chooses Y-MB for her
measurement. The other cases is the same as this one
with or without a little of modification. (c) The agents
publish their results of their measurements, and Alice
analyses the error rate of the samples. If the error rate is
very low, they can conclude that the quantum key, the N
ordered GHZ states is created securely. Otherwise, they
will discard the results and repeat the quantum commu-
nication from the beginning.
For preventing some dishonest agents from stealing
the information about the GHZ states with a fake sig-
nal, Alice adds some decoy photons in the sequence Sq.
That is, Alice prepares some photons randomly in the
states {| + x〉, | − x〉, | + y〉, | − y〉}, with which she re-
places some particles Br in Sq. In this way, the dis-
honest agent cannot eavesdrop the information for the
quantum key Sq with intercepting-resending attack and
cheat. Let us use a simple case as an example to de-
scribe the principle of this eavesdropping. Assume that
there are only two agents, say Bob1 and Bob2, and the
three-particle quantum system is in the state |Ψ〉0 ≡
|GHZ〉00+ = 1√
2
(|000〉 + |111〉)AB1B2 . If Bob1 is a dis-
honest man, he can intercept the particle B2 when it runs
from Alice to Bob2. Instead, Bob1 prepares a Bell state
|ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉)b1b2 and sends Bob2 the particle
b2 and keeps the particle b1. When this quantum system
is chosen by Alice as a sample for eavesdropping check,
Bob1 performs a Bell-basis measurement on the particles
B2 and b1. Then the difference of the state |Ψ〉0 and that
of the particles AB1b2 is just a local unitary operation,
I, σz, σx or iσy,
|Ψ〉0 = 1
2
[(|+ x〉|+ x〉+ | − x〉| − x〉)B1B2 |+ x〉A
+(|+ x〉| − x〉+ | − x〉|+ x〉)B1B2 | − x〉A]
=
1
2
[(|+ y〉| − y〉+ | − y〉|+ y〉)B1B2 |+ x〉A
+(|+ y〉|+ y〉+ | − y〉| − y〉)B1B2 | − x〉A].(2)
|Ψ〉0 ⊗ |ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉)AB1B2
⊗ 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉)b1b2
=
1
2
√
2
[(|001〉 − |110〉)AB1b2 |φ+〉B2b1
+(|001〉+ |110〉)AB1b2 |φ−〉B2b1
−(|000〉 − |111〉)AB1b2 |ψ+〉B2b1
−(|000〉+ |111〉)AB1b2 |ψ−〉B2b1 ], (3)
where
|φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉), |ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉). (4)
Bob1 can hide the difference with cheat. Assume that
the final state of the particles AB1b2 is
|Ψ〉1 ≡ |GHZ〉00− = 1√
2
(|000〉 − |111〉)
=
1
2
[(|+ x〉| − x〉 + | − x〉|+ x〉)B1b2 |+ x〉A
+(|+ x〉|+ x〉 + | − x〉| − x〉)B1b2 | − x〉)A]
=
1
2
[(|+ y〉|+ y〉+ | − y〉| − y〉)B1b2 |+ x〉A
+(|+ y〉| − y〉+ | − y〉|+ y〉)B1b2 | − x〉A]. (5)
Bob1 can publish a counterpart of the result of his
measurement for his attack when the quantum system
3AB1B2 is chosen for eavesdropping check, i.e., if he
measures his particle B1 and obtains his result | + x〉,
he tells Alice that his result is | − x〉. Bob1’s cheat
cannot be detected. The cases with the final states
1√
2
(|001〉 ± |110〉AB1b2 are the same as this one with or
without a little of modification. Fortunately, this attack
does not work for the decoy photons as its security is the
same as the Bennett-Brassard quantum key distribution
protocol. [3, 36] Thus the parties can share a sequence
of GHZ states securely.
(S2) The agents use the GHZ states as the quantum
key and send their secret message to the boss Alice with
a controlled-not (CNot) gate, similar to Ref. [37] (the
difference is just that the quantum key is unknown for
the agents in this scheme). In detail, a agent, say Bobr,
can report his secret message to the boss Alice by means
that he prepares a travelling particle T in the state |α〉T ∈
{|0〉, |1〉}, which represents the classical bit 0 and 1 and
takes a CNot operation on the particle T by using the
qubit Br as the control qubit. For instance, we assume
that the GHZ state in the quantum key is
|G〉 = 1√
2
(|0j · · · i · · · k〉+ |1j¯ · · · i¯ · · · k¯〉)AB1B2···Br···BM .(6)
After the encryption carried out by Bobr with a CNot
operation, the state |Ψ〉s1 of the whole quantum system
composed of the GHZ-state particles and the travelling
particle T is
|Ψ〉s1 = 1√
2
(|0j · · · i · · · k〉|i⊕ α〉
+ |1j¯ · · · i¯ · · · k¯〉|¯i⊕ α〉)AB1B2···Br···BMT . (7)
Bobr sends the particle T to Alice who can decrypt the
qubit T with a CNot operaton on the particles T and A
by using her qubit A as the control qubit after flipping its
bit value or not (if the qubits Br and A is anti-correlated,
Alice should first operates the qubit A with the Pauli
operation σx). The agent Bobr continues the quantum
communication until the quantum key is used up.
In order to estimate the error rate of the transmission
for the T sequence which is composed of all the travelling
particles sent by Bobr, he should insert some sample par-
ticles se3 in the T sequence before it runs in the quantum
line. The number of the particles in se3 is not required to
be very large, but enough for the statistical analysis. As
any eavesdropper does not know the information about
the GHZ states, he cannot decrypt the encryption done
by Bobr. Thus the security of the quantum communi-
cation between Alice and Bobr is the same as that in
quantum one-time pad.[2]
(S3) The agents and Alice use repeatedly the quantum
key conditionally, similar to Ref. [38]. That is, they
first check the security of the quantum key by choosing
a subset of the GHZ states and measuring them with the
two MBs, X-MB and Y-MB, same as that in the process
for creating the quantum key. If Alice confirms that the
quantum key is secure, the parties use the GHZ states
remained again. As the amount of the samples chosen
for checking eavesdropping is negligible comparing with
all the GHZ states, the quantum key is used repeatedly in
the next round if there is no one monitoring the quantum
line.
For saving the GHZ states in the quantum key in the
process for eavesdropping check, Alice and Bobr can first
choose the GHZ states used for encrypting the sample
particles se3 as the samples for checking the security of
the quantum key. Then they choose some other GHZ
states in the sequence Sq for the eavesdropping check.
(S4) The agents and Alice repeat the steps (2) and (3)
until their task is accomplished.
Different from the classical key in one-time pad crypto-
system, the quantum key in this MQSR scheme can be
repeatedly used except for the states chosen for checking
eavesdropping. For the eavesdropper Eve the quantum
key is randomly in one of the two eigenstates of her mea-
suring operation, and then she cannot decrypt the qubits
in the quantum key. Moreover, her action will destroy the
correlation of the particles in a GHZ state and will be de-
tected by the authorized parties. The randomness of the
quantum key for the eavesdropper ensures the security of
the secret message transmitted.
With quantum storage technique,[39] this MQSR
scheme has the advantage of high intrinsic efficiency for
qubits ηq ≡ quqt since almost all qubits are useful in prin-
ciple for transmitting the secret message. Here qu and qt
are the qubits useful and total qubits for the transmis-
sion, respectively. The total efficiency ηt in this scheme
approaches 100% as the classical information exchanged
is unnecessary except for the eavesdropping check. Here
η is defined as [40]
ηt =
qu
qt + bt
, (8)
where bt is the classical bits exchanged between the par-
ties in the quantum communication.
In summary, we have presented a scheme for multi-
party quantum secret report with quantum encryption.
In this scheme, the Boss Alice first shares a sequence of
GHZ states as the quantum key, and then the agents use
a CNot operation to encrypt their message and then send
it to the Boss. The states of the GHZ quantum systems
are unknown for any of the agents, and the quantum
communication is secure same as a quantum one-time
pad crypto-system. They can use the quantum key re-
peatedly except for the GHZ states used for check eaves-
dropping if there is no-one monitoring the quantum line.
This scheme has advantage of having high intrinsic effi-
ciency for qubits ηq and the total efficiency ηt as almost
all the qubits are useful for carrying the secret message
and the classical information exchanged is unnecessary
for the qubits but those chosen for check eavesdropping.
4On the other hand, the parties should have the capability
of storing the GHZ states.
This work is supported by the National Natural Sci-
ence Foundation of China under Grant No 10447106,
and Beijing Education Committee under Grant No
XK100270454.
[1] Nielsen M A and Chuang I L 2000 Quantum computa-
tion and quantum information (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press)
[2] Gisin N, Ribordy G, Tittel W and Zbinden H 2002 Rev.
Mod. Phys. 74 145
[3] Bennett C H and Brassad G 1984 Proc. IEEE Int. Conf.
on Computers, Systems and Signal Processing (Banga-
lore, India (New York: IEEE) pp 175-179
[4] Ekert A K 1991 Phys. Rev. Lett. 67 661
[5] Bennett C H, Brassard G and Mermin N D 1992 Phys.
Rev. Lett. 68 557
[6] Long G L and Liu X S 2002 Phys. Rev. A 65 032302
Deng F G and Long G L 2004 Phys. Rev. A 70 012311
[7] Deng F G and Long G L 2003 Phys. Rev. A 68 042315
[8] Hillery M, Buzˇek V and Berthiaume A 1999 Phys. Rev.
A 59 1829
[9] Karlsson A, Koashi M and Imoto N 1999 Phys. Rev. A
59 162
[10] Guo G P and Guo G C 2003 Phys. Lett. A 310 247
[11] Xiao L et al 2004 Phys. Rev. A 69 052307
Deng F G et al 2005 Phys. Lett. A 337 329
Deng F G et al 2005 Phys. Lett. A 340 43
Li X H et al 2006 J. Phys. B 39 1975
[12] Yan F L and Gao T 2005 Phys. Rev. A 72 012304
[13] Li Y M, Zhang K S and Peng K C 2004 Phys. Lett. A
324 420
[14] Deng F G et al 2005 Phys. Rev. A 72 044301
[15] Deng F G et al 2005 Phys. Rev. A 72 022338
[16] Zhang Z J et al 2005 Phys. Rev. A 71 044301
[17] Shimizu K and Imoto N 1999 Phys. Rev. A 60 157
[18] Shimizu K and Imoto N 2000 Phys. Rev. A 62 054303
[19] Beige A et al. 2002 Acta Phys. Pol. A 101 357
[20] Deng F G, Long G L and Liu X S 2003 Phys. Rev. A 68
042317
[21] Deng F G and Long G L 2004 Phys. Rev. A 69 052319
[22] Wang C et al. 2005 Phys. Rev. A 71 044305
[23] Man Z X, Zhang Z J and Li Y 2005 Chin. Phys. Lett. 22
18
[24] Yan F L, Zhang X 2004 Euro. Phys. J. B 41 75
[25] Gao T, Yan F L and Wang Z X 2005 J. Phys. A 38 5761
[26] Zhu A D et al 2006 Phys. Rev. A 73 022338
[27] Bostro¨m K and Felbinger T 2002 Phys. Rev. Lett. 89
187902
[28] Cai Q Y and Li B W 2004 Chin. Phys. Lett. 21 601
[29] Cai Q Y and Li B W 2004 Phys. Rev. A 69 054301
[30] Cao H J and Song H S 2006 Chin. Phys. Lett. 23 290
[31] Li X H et al 2006 Chin. Phys. Lett. 23 1080
[32] Wo´jcik A 2003 Phys. Rev. Lett. 90 157901
[33] Gao T, Yan F L and Wang Z X 2005 Chin. Phys. Lett.
22 2473
[34] Jin X R et al 2006 Phys. Lett. A 354 67
[35] Bennett C H and Wiesner S J 1992 Phys. Rev. Lett. 69
2881
[36] Lo H K and Chau H F 1999 Science 283 2050
Shor P W and Preskill J 2000 Phys. Rev. Lett. 85 441
[37] Zhang Y S, Li C F and Guo G C 2001 Phys. Rev. A 64
024302
[38] Li X H, Zhou P, Li C Y, Zhou H Y and Deng F G 2006
Preprint arXiv:quant-ph/0512014
[39] Sun C P et al 2003 Phys. Rev. Lett. 91 147903
Philips D F et al 2001 Phys. Rev. Lett. 86 783
[40] Cabello A 2000 Phys. Rev. Lett. 85 5635
Li C Y et al 2005 Chin. Phys. Lett. 22 1049
